Zelensky's mafia collapsing.

Since yesterday nobody can find the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

After millions of dollars been found in his office, he is hiding.

He is accused of covering scam call-centers that were stealing money from elders in the USA and Europe.

I already…

— Diana Panchenko 🇺🇦 (@Panchenko_X) September 5, 2026

We asked both Gemini and Grok what organised crime there is in BlackRock/Von der Lyin’/Burnham/Macron/Merz/Zelenskyland, a.k.a. Ukraine–

Gemini

Organized crime in Ukraine is heavily shaped by the ongoing war, systemic corruption, and a shift toward digital fraud, synthetic drug production, and illegal border smuggling. [1, 2]

Major Criminal Activities

• Synthetic Drug Production: Traditional maritime transit for cocaine and heroin dropped significantly due to wartime port closures. Instead, organized groups like Khimprom expanded large-scale domestic production of synthetic drugs and methadone. [1]
• Draft Evasion and Smuggling: Strict martial law prevents men aged 18 to 60 from leaving Ukraine. This restriction created a lucrative, digital-coordinated smuggling market using forged medical documents to help individuals cross borders illegally. [1]
• Cybercrime and Scam Hubs: Port cities like Odesa operate under a loose criminal model hosting scam call centers, digital financial fraud, and large-scale tax evasion tied to grain exports. [1]
• Legacy Mafia and Corruption: Post-Soviet mafia-style networks maintain historic ties to political and economic corruption. While many top crime bosses briefly relocated abroad after the 2022 invasion, many later returned to restructure their domestic enterprises. [1, 2]
• Explore detailed regional criminal dynamics on the OC Index profile.

Grok

Organized crime in Ukraine involves a complex ecosystem of structured groups, looser networks, and opportunistic actors engaged in drugs, fraud, trafficking, economic crimes, and other activities. The full-scale Russian invasion since 2022 has disrupted traditional routes and groups while creating new opportunities and adaptations.

No single organization dominates. The landscape includes traditional “thieves-in-law” (vory-v-zakone) networks (many of whose leaders are abroad and which have faced stronger enforcement), professional structured groups, functional racketeering outfits, ethnic-based networks, and hybrid actors with corrupt ties. Pre-war links with Russian organized crime were largely severed, though some residual activity has been reported in places like Odesa.

Major illicit markets (post-2022 shifts)

According to a July 2025 UNODC report and related analyses, key areas include:

• Drug trafficking and production: Traditional cocaine and heroin transit (e.g., Afghan heroin routes via the Black Sea/Odesa or overland) dropped sharply due to closed ports, airports, and border disruptions. Synthetic drugs have risen instead, including cathinones and methadone, driven by domestic demand and darknet facilitation (e.g., after Hydra’s dismantling). Structured groups such as Khimprom and Dvadtsiativski are involved in production and trafficking; much methadone stays domestic.
• Online scams, cyberfraud, and call centers: Cases more than tripled in some periods. An estimated 1,000–1,500 call centers operate (concentrated in Dnipro and Kyiv, with spread to other cities), employing tens of thousands and generating potentially very large revenues (one GI-TOC-linked estimate suggested up to ~$1 billion monthly industry-wide before major crackdowns, though profits concentrate at the top and overheads are high). Three major networks reportedly control much of the sector, with organized crime involvement and past protection issues. Victims include Ukrainians (including displaced people) and Europeans; some operations have targeted Russians. Recent enforcement (including by NABU/SAPO) has shut centers and exposed related corruption, such as a 2025–2026 criminal organization allegedly headed by a Prosecutor General’s Office official that protected call centers in exchange for bribes and laundered proceeds.
• Arms trafficking: Large volumes of weapons from the conflict have increased domestic availability, seizures, and some civilian violence (including domestic). There is no strong evidence of large-scale outbound trafficking to Europe so far, but monitoring continues due to historical regional actors and surplus risks. Emerging concerns include potential misuse of drones or 3D-printed components.
• Trafficking in persons and related facilitation: Displacement of millions has raised risks. Groups exploit vulnerable people (e.g., via fake humanitarian aid/shelters leading to forced labor). There is also facilitation of illegal border exits and draft evasion.
• Economic crime and smuggling: Includes cigarette/customs fraud, budget fund theft, amber mining (“amber mafia” in northwestern regions involving illegal extraction, smuggling, and local control), grain-related fraud, and other corruption-linked schemes. Extortion/racketeering persists in some sectors. Gambling-related issues and money laundering also appear.
• Other: Historical involvement in human/sex trafficking, counterfeit goods, and contract violence. Some foreign elements (e.g., Georgian, Azerbaijani, or other networks) operate alongside Ukrainian ones. Odesa remains a noted hub with a relatively open “free city” underworld model for certain activities, though military/security presence constrains it.

Structures, scale, and response

Ukrainian police and prosecutors report hundreds of organized groups/criminal organizations detected annually, with significant cases involving drugs, budget theft, corruption links, interregional/transnational ties, and illegal border activity. Numbers of related crimes rose substantially from 2020–2024 in some statistics. Traditional hierarchical groups have been pressured; many activities are more networked or adaptive.

Authorities (National Police strategic investigations, NABU, SAPO, cyber police, etc.) actively prosecute, with international cooperation (Europol, etc.) on cross-border cases such as drug corridors or underground banking. Corruption remains a facilitator and target of enforcement—recent high-profile cases involve officials protecting fraud operations or energy-sector schemes.

The war caused initial disruption (dispersion of groups, route changes), followed by adaptation and partial recovery of illicit activity by 2023 onward, though often not to pre-war levels in traditional markets. Displacement, mobilization pressures, economic strain, and weapons proliferation create ongoing risks. For the most detailed official analysis, see the UNODC report Ukraine: Organized Crime Dynamics in the Context of War (2025).